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If space is indistinguishable from the extension of a physical body, as is Descartes’s conception,
then transformations of space become transformations of physical bodies. Every point of space
then has properties of physical bodies in some suitable non-singular sense of average over the space.
Every point of space is then thinkable as a non-singular point particle possessing such (averaged)
physical properties. Then, the location of such a point particle is, relative to another (similar)
point particle, indeterminate over the extension of the physical body. Further, transformations
of the space may “move” such a point particle in relation to another such point particle. These
notions then provide a non-probabilistic explanation of Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations.
To be submitted to: General Relativity & Gravitation
I. INTRODUCTION
Newtonian mechanics ascribes independent and
real existence to space, time and matter. In New-
ton’s theory, space and time also play a dual role.
Firstly, they play the role of a “background” for
things happening physically to matter. Secondly,
they also provide us the inertial systems which
happen to be advantageous to describe Newton’s
law of inertia. Then, if matter were to be removed
completely, the space and time of the newtonian
framework would “remain” behind.
Descartes opposed [1] the concept of space as
being independent of physical objects. Essentially,
he stated: the space is identical with extension, but
extension is connected with physical bodies; thus
there should be no space without physical bodies
and hence no empty space. There certainly are [1]
(philosophical) weaknesses [5] of such an argument.
However, let “the space be indistinguishable from
physical bodies.”
The question is then of some suitable theoretical
(mathematical) formulation which describes space
(and physical bodies) as per Descartes’s concep-
tion. Such a description can be expected to possess
the following characteristics.
In this description, Cartan’s volume-form should
be well-defined at every spatial location. A point
of space could also be prescribed, in some suit-
able non-singular sense, the inertia, electric charge
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etc. Then, we could also look at such a point as
a point particle in the newtonian sense. We may
also look at a physical body in the newtonian, non-
singular, sense of a point particle possessing vari-
ous properties of a physical body. Thus, physical
bodies should everywhere in space be describable
as singularity-free.
In this description, there cannot therefore be any
spatial location without a physical property of a
material object. Hence, any local motion of a phys-
ical body will, clearly, be a change in the (suitable)
structure of the space.
The issue is of incorporating time in this frame-
work. Now, the temporal evolution of “points of
space” is a mathematically well-definable concept
- as a dynamical system.
Then, Descartes’s conceptions could be realiz-
able in some mathematically well-defined formal-
ism that deals with dynamical systems defined on
continuum as the underlying set.
Such a description then also follows the principle
of general covariance: the laws regarding physical
objects in it are based on the arbitrary coordinate
transformations of the underlying space and also
on time as an essentially arbitrary parameter of
the dynamical system.
The question now is of suitable mathematical
structure on the space that allows us the associ-
ation of physical properties of material objects to
the points of the space. Furthermore, the question
is also of defining in a natural manner the bound-
ary of any physical object.
A physical object has associated with it vari-
ous (fundamental) physical properties, eg, (rest)
energy. Then, the adjacent objects clearly sep-
arate by boundaries at which the spatial deriva-
tive(s) of that property under consideration, (eg,
rest energy), change(s) the sign.
2But, a physical object is a region of space as
per Descartes’s conception. Therefore, some suit-
able structure definable on the space must, as
per Descartes’s conception, then possess a simi-
lar property of its derivative changing its sign at a
boundary of a physical object. It then also follows
that a physical property can, essentially, be spec-
ified independently for each spatial direction since
these directions are to be treated as independent
of each other.
Now, the space (continuum) is characterizable
by “distance” separating its points. Suitable “dis-
tance” function can then be expected [6] to pos-
sess the property of its derivative(s) changing sign
across boundaries separating regions of space cor-
responding to separated objects. This suitable dis-
tance function then, mathematically, becomes a
pseudo-metric function on the space, remaining a
metric function within a region.
Consider therefore a three-dimensional pseudo-
Riemannian manifold, denoted as B, admitting a
pseudo-metric [2]:
dℓ2 = P ′
2
Q2R2 dx2
+ P 2Q¯2R2 dy2
+ P 2Q2R˜2 dz2 (1)
where we have P ≡ P (x), Q ≡ Q(y), R ≡ R(z)
and P ′ = dP/dx, Q¯ = dQ/dy, R˜ = dR/dz. The
vanishing of any of these spatial functions is a cur-
vature singularity, and constancy (over a range) is
a degeneracy of (1).
A choice of functions, say, Po, Qo, Ro is a specific
distribution of “physical properties” in the space
of (1). As some “region” of physical properties
“moves” in the space, we have the original set of
functions changing to the “new” set of correspond-
ing functions, say, P1, Q1, R1.
Clearly, we are considering the isometries of (1)
while considering “motion” of this kind. Then, we
will remain within the group of the isometries of (1)
by restricting to the triplets of nowhere-vanishing
functions P , Q, R. We also do not consider any
degenerate situations for (1).
If we denote by ℓ the pseudo-metric function
corresponding to (1), then (B, ℓ) is an uncount-
able, separable, complete pseudo-metric space. If
we denote by d, a metric function canonically [3]
obtainable [7] from the pseudo-metric (1), then the
space (B, d) is an uncountable, separable, complete
metric space. If Γ denotes the metric topology in-
duced by d on B, then (B,Γ) is a Polish topological
space. Further, we also obtain a Standard Borel
Space (B,B) where B denotes the Borel σ-algebra
of the subsets of B, the smallest one containing all
the open subsets of (B,Γ) [4].
A measurable, one-one map of B onto itself is
a Borel automorphism. Now, the Borel automor-
phisms of (B,B), forming a group, are natural for
us to consider here.
But, the pseudo-metric (1) is a metric function
on certain “open” sets, to be called the P-sets, of
its Polish topology Γ. A P-set of (B, d) is therefore
never a singleton subset, {{x} : x ∈ B}, of the
space B. Note also that every open set of (B,Γ) is
not a P-set of (B, d).
Now, the differential of the volume-measure on
B, defined by (1), is
dµ = P 2Q2R2
(
dP
dx
dQ
dy
dR
dz
)
dx dy dz (2)
This differential of the volume-measure vanishes
when any of the derivatives, of P , Q, R with re-
spect to their arguments, vanishes. (Functions P ,
Q, R are non-vanishing over B.)
A P-set of the space B is then also thinkable as
the interior of a region of B for which the differ-
ential of the volume-measure, (2), is vanishing on
its boundary while it being non-vanishing at any
of its interior points.
Any two P-sets, Pi and Pj , i, j ∈ N, i 6= j,
are, consequently, pairwise disjoint sets of B. Also,
each P-set is, in its own right, an uncountable,
complete, separable, metric space.
Evidently, a P-set is the mathematically simplest
form of “localized” physical properties in the space
B and we call it a physical particle. This suggests
that suitable mathematical properties of a P-set
can represent physical properties.
We then recall that the Galilean concept of the
(inertial) mass of a physical body is that of the
measure of its inertia. Therefore, some appropriate
measure definable for a P-set is the property of
inertia of a physical body, a P-set in question. So
also should be the case with the gravitational mass
of a physical body. Such should also be the case
with other relevant properties of physical bodies,
for example, its electric charge.
Also, signed measures are definable on a P-set as
well. Signed measures then provide us the notion
of the “polarity” of certain properties. For exam-
ple, a signed measure can provide the polarity of
an electric charge.
Thus, we associate with every attribute of a
physical body, a suitable class of (Lebesgue) mea-
sures on such P-sets. Therefore, a P-set is a physi-
cal particle, always an extended body, since a P-set
cannot be a singleton set of (B, d).
Therefore, various physical properties (mea-
sures) change only when the region of space (P-
set) changes. Thus, a region of space (P-set) and
physical properties (the measures on P-sets) are,
3then, are amalgamated into one thing here. This
union of the space and the physical properties is
then clearly perceptible here.
Moreover, a given measure can be integrated
over the underlying P-set in question. The inte-
gration procedure is always a well-defined one for
obvious reasons.
The value of the integral provides then an “av-
eraged quantity characteristic of a P-set” under
question. Of course, this is a property of the en-
tire P-set under consideration.
For example, let us define an almost-everywhere
finite-valued positive-definite measurable function,
ρ, on (B,B). Let us call its class the energy den-
sity. Integrating it over the volume of a P-set, the
resultant quantity can be called a total mass, m
T
,
of that P-set under consideration. The total mass,
m
T
, is a property of that entire P-set and, hence,
of every point of that P-set.
(Clearly, to define the notions of “gravitational
mass” and of “inertial mass” of a P-set, we need to
consider the “motion” of a P-set and also an appro-
priate notion of the “force” acting on that P-set.
Since we are yet to define any of these associated
notions, we call the integrated energy density as,
simply, the total mass of the P-set.)
We note that every point of the P-set is then
thinkable as having these averaged properties of
the P-set and, in this precise non-singular sense, is
thinkable as a point-particle possessing those av-
eraged properties. It is in this non-singular sense
that points of the space B are point particles in the
present framework.
Clearly, the “location” of the mass m
T
will be
indeterminate over the size of that P-set because
the averaged property is also the property of every
point of the set under consideration.
Now, in a precise mathematical sense [3], sets
can be touching and that describes our intuitive
notion of touching physical bodies. Of course, the
corresponding point particles are then “touching”
within the limits defined by the sizes, boundaries,
of the corresponding P-sets.
A Borel automorphism of (B,B) then induces an
associated transformation of (B, d), say, to (B, d′),
and that “moves” P-sets about in B, since (suitably
defined) distance between the P-sets can change
under that Borel automorphism.
The individuality of a point particle is clearly
that of the corresponding P-set. As noted before,
in the present formalism, a point particle is a point
of the P-set of the space B with associated inte-
grated measures defined on that P-set. As a Borel
automorphism of the space B changes that P-set,
the integrated properties also change and, hence,
the initial particle changes into another particle(s),
since integrated measures change.
Here, the notion of energy of a point particle is
then that of some suitably defined integrated mea-
sure defined on a P-set of the space B. The notion
of the momentum of a point particle (as a point of
the P-set of B with associated integrated measures
on that P-set) is then that of the appropriately de-
fined notion of the rate of change of, some suitably
defined, “physical distance” under the action of a
Borel automorphism of B, including evidently any
changes that may occur to measures definable on
that P-set. Therefore, the notions of energy and
momentum of a particle are certainly (well-) defin-
able in the present formalism.
Of course, we then need to discover various laws
of such transformations of point particles into one
another in the present formalism. But, it is clear
at the outset that these will crucially depend on
the structure of the group of Borel automorphisms
of the space B.
Further, if a P-set splits into two or more P-
sets, we have the process of creation of particles
since the measures are now definable individually
over the split parts, two or more P-sets. On the
other hand, if two or more P-sets unite to become
a single P-set, we have the process of annihilation
of particles since the measures are now definable
over a single P-set.
Clearly, the laws of creation and annihilation of
particles will require of us to specify the corre-
sponding transformations causing the splitting and
the merger of the P-sets.
Now, we call as an object a region of B bounded
by the vanishing of (2) but containing interior
points for which it vanishes (so such a region is
not a P-set). Such a region of B is then a collec-
tion of P-sets. But, a P-set is a particle. Therefore,
an object is a collection of particles.
Objects may also unite to become a single object
or an object may also split into two or more than
two objects under transformations of P-sets. We
may then also think of the corresponding laws for
these processes involving objects.
Moreover, the metric of (B, d) allows us the pre-
cise definition of the sizes of P-sets and objects.
Then, given an object of specific size, we may use
it as a measuring rod to measure “distance” be-
tween two other objects.
We call this the “physical” distance separating
P-sets (as extended bodies). We also (naturally)
define distance separating objects.
Now, the Borel automorphisms of the space B
can be classified as
(1) those which preserve and,
(2) those which do not preserve
measures defined on a specific P-set.
4Note that we are restricting our attention to only
a specific P-set/Object and not every P-set/Object
is under consideration here.
Measure-preserving Borel automorphisms of the
space B then “transform” a P-set maintaining its
characteristic classes of (Lebesgue) measures, that
is, its physical properties.
Non-measure-preserving Borel automorphisms
change the characteristic classes of Lebesgue mea-
sures (physical properties) of a P-set while “trans-
forming” it. Evidently, such considerations also
apply to objects.
It is therefore permissible that a particular pe-
riodic Borel automorphism leads to an oscillatory
motion of a P-set or an object while preserving its
class of characteristic measures.
We can then think of an object undergoing pe-
riodic motion as a (physically realizable) time-
measuring clock. Such an object undergoing oscil-
latory motion then “measures” the time-parameter
of the corresponding (periodic) Borel automor-
phism since the period of the motion of such an
object is precisely the period of the corresponding
Borel automorphism.
Then, within the present formalism, ameasuring
clock is therefore any P-set or an object undergoing
periodic motion.
Then, crucially, the present formalism represents
measuring apparatuses, measuring rods and mea-
suring clocks, on par with every other thing that
the formalism intends to treat.
Such considerations then suggest an appropriate
distance function, physical distance, on the fam-
ily of all P-sets/objects of the space (B, d). More
than one such distance function will be definable,
depending obviously on the collection of P-sets or
objects that we may be considering in the form of
a measuring rod or measuring clock.
This above is permissible since we are dealing
here with a continuum which is a standard Borel
space with Polish topology. Relevant mathemati-
cal results can be found in [4].
A Borel automorphism of (B,B) may change the
physical distance resulting into “relative motion”
of objects. We also note here that the sets invariant
under the specific Borel automorphism are charac-
teristic of that automorphism. Hence, such sets
will then have their distance “fixed” under that
Borel automorphism and will be stationary rela-
tive to each other.
On a different note, an automorphism, keeping
invariant a chain of objects separating two other
objects, can describe the situation of two or more
relatively stationary objects.
Effects of the Borel automorphisms of (B,B)
on the (mathematically well defined) physical dis-
tance are then motions of physical bodies.
Obviously, various concepts such as the density
of point particles, a flux of point particles across
some surface etc. are then well definable in terms
of the transformations of P-sets and the effects of
these transformations on the measures definable
over the P-sets under consideration.
Then, we note that such “averaging procedures”
are well-defined over any collection of P-sets and,
also, of objects. Thus, we may, in a mathemat-
ically meaningful way, define a suitable “energy-
momentum tensor” [8] and some relation between
the averaged quantities, an “equation of state”
defining appropriately the “state of the fluid mat-
ter” under consideration.
(Such conceptions require however the notion of
transformations of P-sets and objects. Moreover,
this averaging is a “sum total” of the effects of
various such transformations of P-sets and objects
and, hence, will require corresponding mathemat-
ical machinery. This is, then, the premise of the
ergodic theory. Recall that (B,B) is a Standard
Borel Space.
Einstein’s field equations are then definable in
the sense (only) of these averages. Therefore, Ein-
stein’s equations are “obtainable” on the basis of
the temporal evolution of point particles, points of
the 3-space B. Descartes’s conceptions are then
also realizable in the present formalism.)
Clearly, a joint manifestation of Borel automor-
phisms of the space (B,B) and the association, as
a point particle, of integrated measures definable
on a P-set with the points of a P-set is a candi-
date reason behind Heisenberg’s indeterminacy re-
lations in the present continuum formulation [9]
since intrinsic indeterminacy exists here.
Intuitively, as well as in a mathematically precise
sense, it can be seen that as the size of the P-set
gets smaller and smaller the position of the point-
particle (of integrated characteristics of a P-set)
is determinable more and more accurately. (But,
recall that a P-set is never a singleton subset of
B. So, complete positional localization of a point
particle is not permissible.)
Now, any experimental arrangement to deter-
mine a physical property of a P-set is based on
some specific “arrangement” of P-sets and involves
corresponding Borel automorphisms of B affecting
those P-sets. For example, Heisenberg’s micro-
scope attempting the determination of the loca-
tion of an electron involves the collision of a pho-
ton with an electron. It therefore has an associ-
ated Borel automorphism producing the motion of
a specific P-set, a photon.
Although we have not specified the sense [10] in
which a P-set can be a photon, it is clear that the
Borel automorphism causing its motion will also
affect an electron as a P-set.
5Thus, a P-set “transforms” as a result of our
efforts to “determine any of its characteristic mea-
sures” since these “efforts or experimental arrange-
ments” are also Borel automorphisms, not neces-
sarily the members of the class of Borel automor-
phisms keeping invariant that P-set (as well as the
class of its characteristic measures).
Hence, a Borel automorphism (experimental ar-
rangement) “determining” a characteristic mea-
sure of a P-set changes, in effect, the very quan-
tity that it is trying to determine. This peculiarity
then leads to Heisenberg’s (corresponding) inde-
terminacy relation.
Then, in the present continuum description, it
is indeed possible to explain the origin of Heisen-
berg’s indeterminacy relations. The present con-
tinuum description provides us therefore an ori-
gin of indeterminacy relations. This is in complete
contrast to their probabilistic origin as advocated
by the standard quantum theory.
Notice also that, in the present considerations,
we began with none of the fundamental considera-
tions of the concept of a quantum. But, one of the
basic characteristics of the conception of a quan-
tum, Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation, emerges
out of the present formalism.
Then, in the present framework, we have also
done away with the “singular nature” of the parti-
cles and, hence, also with the unsatisfactory du-
alism of the field (space) and the source parti-
cle. Furthermore, we have, simultaneously, well-
defined laws of motion (Borel automorphisms) for
the field (space) and also for the well-defined con-
ception of a point particle (of integrated measure
characteristics). The present formalism is there-
fore a complete field theory.
Further, none of the two notions of location
and momentum is any deficient for a description
of the facts since Heisenberg’s indeterminacy re-
lations are also “explainable” within the present
formalism. This explanation crucially hinges on
the fact that the points of the space B, as single-
ton subsets of the space B, are never the P-sets.
It is only in the sense of associating the measures
integrated over a P-set that the points of the space
B are point particles.
The measurable location of a particle is essen-
tially a different conception and that depends on
the physical distance definable on the class of all
P-sets of the space B. The measurable momentum
of a particle is also dependent on the notion of the
physical distance changing under the action of a
Borel automorphism of B.
A comment on the mathematical methods would
not be out of place here. Then, we note that the
mathematical formalism of the ergodic theory is
what is of immediate use for the present physical
framework. This much is already clear from the
above considerations.
However, it is not entirely satisfactory to use the
present methods of ergodic theory. One of the pri-
mary reasons for this state of affairs is the inability
of the present methods in ergodic theory to let us
handle, in a physical sense, the P-sets. Some newer
methods are then required here.
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